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Abstract 
We estimate a system of equations to analyze whether bilateral trade and financial 
linkages influence business cycle synchronization directly and/or indirectly. Our paper builds 
upon the existing literature by using bilateral trade and financial flows for a small, open 
economy (Spain) as benchmark for the results, instead of the US as generally done in the 
literature. We find that both the similarity of productive structure and trade links 
promote the synchronization of cycles. However, bilateral financial links are inversely 
related to the co-movement of output. This might point to financial integration allowing an 
easier transfer of resources between two economies, which could enable their decoupling, 
as predicted by a standard model of international business cycles. Both the effects of 
trade and financial links on output synchronization are statistically significant and 
economically relevant. 
JEL Classification:  E32, F41, F12, E44. 
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1 Introduction 
The last few years have witnessed increasing economic globalization stemming from very 
rapid growth in trade and financial linkages, among other factors. At first sight, one would be 
tempted to think that tighter trade and financial linkages contribute to the synchronization of 
business cycles. However, theoretical models do not have a clear prediction regarding the 
relationship between these variables. In fact, the theoretical literature proposes both positive 
and negative effects of trade and financial links on the synchronization of cycles, which may, 
in principle, counteract each other. The question is therefore an empirical one, but the 
empirical literature also reflects these unclear theoretical predictions, as there are a number of 
diverging results when testing for the influence of trade and financial integration on business 
cycle co-movements, which could be due, in part, to the lack of data on bilateral financial 
flows. This paper estimates the effect of bilateral trade and financial links on output 
co-movement for a small, open economy such as Spain. We assess whether these two 
types of linkages exert a positive or negative influence over the synchronization of output and 
whether the influence is not only statistically but also economically significant. 
Assessing whether there is more or less output synchronization is important for 
a number of reasons. First, more synchronized business cycles would presumably mean a 
stronger and faster transmission of shocks across countries, which could provide an 
important reason in favor of international policy coordination. Second, business-cycle 
synchronization has profound implications for the design and functioning of common currency 
areas. Third, if business cycles in a country are mostly driven by external factors, domestic 
policy aimed at economic stabilization will probably have a smaller impact. 
Besides knowing whether outputs are more or less synchronized, it is also interesting 
to know the source of such synchronization. For example, it is important to disentangle 
whether outputs are synchronized due to the effects of common exogenous shocks (e.g. an 
oil shock) or due to spillovers stemming from greater integration. In the same vein, if trade 
linkages lead to business cycle synchronization, external demand will not dampen economic 
fluctuations, but quite the opposite. This implies that exchange rate policy will be unlikely to 
play an important role in boosting demand at times of low economic activity. Another 
interesting application concerns policy reform: knowing whether trade or financial links 
determine stronger output synchronization might condition the sequence and pace of 
opening of the current and financial account. 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature mainly in two ways. First, most of 
the existing studies analyze the issue estimating a reduced-form equation. However, there are 
a number of effects between trade linkages, financial integration and business cycle 
synchronization —some of them bidirectional—, which need to be taken into account for 
meaningful results. Although, in principle, instrumental variables can solve these endogeneity 
problems, the possibility of conflicting indirect effects between these variables might lead to 
low net effects, even when partial effects are strong. We, therefore, use a system of equations 
to disentangle direct and indirect effects on the synchronization of business cycles. 
Second, many studies suffer from the lack of bilateral data to measure financial 
linkages and use aggregate financial stocks or flows as a rough proxy. However, aggregate 
financial flows, which measure financial integration with the rest of the world, are clearly 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0810 
inadequate to explain business cycle co-movements between two countries. The few studies 
with bilateral data generally use US bilateral financial flows against the rest of the world 
(or those of the largest economies). There is an important caveat in using these data: such a 
large economy, or area, influences other countries through many channels other than trade 
and financial linkages, something that biases the estimated effect on synchronization of 
activity. To minimize this problem, we take a relatively small and open economy (Spain), as a 
benchmark and use a new dataset on bilateral financial flows between Spain and a large 
number of countries, from the Spanish Balance of Payments. 
From our empirical exercise, we obtain several conclusions: as in Imbs (2004 
and 2006) we find that, both the similarity of productive structure and trade links enhance the 
synchronization of business cycles. However, our use of bilateral financial flows [as opposed 
to Imbs (2004)], including many emerging economies in the sample [contrary to Imbs (2006)], 
gives us very different results. Contrary to him, we find that bilateral financial links are inversely 
related to the degree of output comovement, as would be predicted by a standard model of 
international business cycles [e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992)].1 As highlighted also 
by Heathcote and Perry (2004), this negative relationship might point to financial integration 
allowing an easier transfer of resources between two economies, something that could 
enable their decoupling. Both the effects of trade and financial links on output synchronization 
are statistically and economically significant. In particular, in our benchmark regression we find 
that increasing trade links by one standard deviation starting from its sample mean raises the 
bilateral cross-country correlation of GDP from its sample mean of 0.160 to 0.311. In turn, 
increasing financial links by one standard deviation from its mean lowers the correlation of 
output from 0.160 to 0.005. In both cases, this represents moving the correlation of output 
by around 40% of one standard deviation, an economically significant effect. We also find a 
positive indirect effect of financial linkages on output synchronization: more financially 
integrated countries induce an increased similarity of productive structures, which in 
turn increases the correlation of output. This indirect effect of financial links on output 
co-movement, which has the opposite sign of the direct effect, turns out to be of a lower 
magnitude than the latter. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews recent 
literature on the relationship between trade and financial integration and business cycle 
synchronization; section 3 outlines the main theoretical predictions and the estimation 
strategy; section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 concludes. 
                                                                          
1. For example, in a model with two countries with perfectly integrated financial markets and where output fluctuations 
are driven by technology shocks, resources will flow towards the country receiving a positive productivity shock from the 
other country. This will reduce further the degree of output correlation between the two countries, beyond what would 
be explained by the different exogenous shock alone. 
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2 Related Literature and theoretical predictions 
Although the synchronization of business cycles has been extensively analyzed in the 
literature, its determinants have not been unequivocally assessed. Neither the theoretical nor 
the empirical literature offer a definitive answer on the direction or sign of potential channels 
by which trade or financial links may affect business cycle synchronization. Regarding real 
links, Kose and Yi (2001) suggest that higher trade integration might lead to more or less 
synchronization of cycles, depending on the nature of trade and the type of shocks 
affecting both economies. Countries will become more synchronized if there is an increase 
of intra-industry trade and industry-specific shocks are the main drivers of business 
cycles. However, if there were more inter-industry trade (i.e. higher specialization), then 
industry-specific shocks would reduce the co-movement of output in both countries. 
Empirical studies have found that higher trade integration increases cross-country output 
correlations, especially among advanced economies [Frankel and Rose (1998); Clark and van 
Wincoop (2001); Imbs (2004 and 2006)], possibly reflecting the prevalence and increase of 
intra-industry trade rather than inter-industry trade. 
There might also be some indirect effects of trade links on output 
synchronization, through the similarity of productive structure or through financial links. 
Thus, for example, stronger trade links might increase financial linkages because they 
promote FDI in export-oriented sectors, or because they foster international loans [Rose and 
Spiegel (2004)]. In turn, stronger trade links might induce more or less similarity of economic 
structure —depending on whether it is mostly inter-industries or intra-industries— which, in 
turn, influences the co-movement of output. 
As for financial linkages, some studies have pointed out a positive relationship 
between financial integration and business cycle co-movements both in output and 
consumption in the case of advanced economies [Imbs (2004 and 2006)]. This empirical 
result, which runs against the predictions of a standard international business cycle model 
[Backus et. al (1992)] does not seem to extend to developing economies [Kose, Prasad and 
Terrones (2003)], something that might explain the difference between our results in section 4 
and those of Imbs (2004 and 2006). In addition, Heathcote and Perri (2004) propose 
that higher financial integration may arise because of less correlated real shocks, since the 
diversification gains from asset trade are bigger. By fostering financial flows, financial 
integration, in turn, would dampen GDP correlations more than the reduction implied by the 
lower correlation of shocks, in effect decoupling both economies. 
As it is the case of trade linkages, there might also be some indirect effects of 
financial links on output synchronization, through trade links or the similarity of productive 
structure. In the first case, stronger financial links might allow the relocation of capital by 
comparative advantage, thus increasing opportunities for trade. In the second case, more 
financial integration between two economies might increase the similarity of economic 
structures between the two countries, if FDI flows are concentrated on those sectors where 
the source country has a comparative advantage, thus replicating the productive structure at 
home. However, stronger financial links also allow the unhinging of production and 
consumption, and therefore make it less costly to achieve greater specialization in 
production and so differing economic structures [Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) and Helpman 
and Razin (1978)]. 
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The methodology generally used in the literature to test for the relevance of trade and 
financial channels is the estimation of a single equation. The fact that there may be indirect 
effects going in opposite directions might account for the generally small impact found 
in studies using single equation regressions. In fact, Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003), using 
a single-equation regression, find a positive effect of trade on business cycle synchronization, 
but a non-significant effect of financial links on output (and consumption) comovement. 
To address the possibility of conflicting indirect effects, Imbs (2004 and 2006) estimates a 
system of simultaneous equations to take into account direct and indirect effects on 
the synchronization of output but there are a number of differences between his analysis 
and ours. First, he does not consider the possible two-way relationship between financial and 
trade linkages [Aizenman and Noy (2001)] or the incentives for financial linkages that 
might stem from a low correlation of business cycles [Heathcote and Perri (2004)]. 
Second, Imbs (2004 and 2006) works with a limited set of countries —41 in Imbs (2006) and 
24 in Imbs (2004)—, with a very high proportion of rich economies in the sample. Having 
mostly developed countries in the sample might induce a selection bias in the results, as 
developing countries are also likely to have weak links, especially financial ones. More 
importantly, as highlighted by Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003), the positive association 
between financial links and output synchronization disappears for developing economies. 
Third, measures of financial integration in Imbs (2004) consider global financial flows for each 
country, instead of bilateral financial flows between a country-pair. Imbs (2006) uses a cross 
section of bilateral investment positions with data from the CPIS, although the quality of the 
data is questionable.2 Fourth, his estimated coefficients in Imbs (2004) might be picking up 
some other channels through which big economies affect other countries’ business cycles. 
Finally, Imbs (2004) includes output correlations from the 80s and 90s. However, the 
existence of a number of global common shocks in the 80s (although less prevalent than in 
the 70s) makes it difficult to identify the source of output co-movements. 
                                                                          
2. The CPIS matrix on bilateral financial flows compiled by the IMF provides data for a limited number of years, which is 
by surveys and therefore is prone to underreporting. 
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3 Data and Estimation 
We assess empirically whether bilateral trade and financial linkages foster or hinder 
output co-movement, while taking into account other potentially relevant determinants of 
business cycle synchronization. 
As described in the previous section, both in the case of trade and financial linkages, 
there are arguments for and against their fostering synchronization. Such different arguments 
are based on multi-directional channels of influence. This implies potential endogeneity 
problems in naïve OLS estimations. Moreover, the different directions of indirect effects might 
offset each other and lead to very small net effects if we just try to correct the endogeneity 
problem using instrumental variables in a reduced-form estimation as in Kose, Prasad and 
Terrones (2003). Thus, we shall use a system of equations to deal with this problem. We also 
control for other possible sources of synchronization, such as the convergence of economic 
policies —which we approximate with the volatility of exchange rates and the differences in 
inflation rates— or a similar exposure to global shocks, such as oil shocks. 
As already mentioned, we use bilateral data to account for trade and financial 
linkages. While data on bilateral trade flows is readily available from the IMF’s Direction 
of Trade Statistics, bilateral financial flows are particularly difficult to find except for the US3. 
This paper uses a newly processed dataset for bilateral financial flows (including FDI, but also 
portfolio flows, including equity transactions other than those considered as FDI), obtained 
from the Spanish Balance of Payments. Choosing Spain as a benchmark country also has the 
advantage of using a small open economy whose financial markets are unlikely to have other 
channels of influence on other countries, limiting the problem of omitted variables in previous 
studies. 
We thus estimate a system of four equations, in which we test for the determinants 
of output co-movement (eq. 1), those of trade and financial linkages (eqs. 2 and 3, 
respectively) and those of the similarity in productive structure (eq. 4). As previously explained, 
there are theoretical reasons to support the idea that the latter could be a key variable 
governing the indirect effects of trade and financial links on cycle comovements, as already 
found by Imbs (2004 and 2006): 
 (Eq. 1): log(ρi,t) = α0 + α1 log(Ti,t) + α2 log(Si,t) + α3 log(Fi,t) + Controls(ρ) + ερ 
 (Eq. 2): log(Ti,t) = β0 + β1 log(Si,t) +β2 log(Fi,t) + Controls(T) + εT 
 (Eq. 3): log(Fi,t) = δ0 + δ1 log(ρi,t) + δ2 log(Ti,t) + Controls(F) + εF 
 (Eq. 4): log(Si,t) = γ0 + γ1 log(Ti,t) + γ2 log(Fi,t) + Controls(S) + εS 
where ρi,t is the correlation between Spain’s output and country i at time t; Ti,t  is bilateral trade 
integration between Spain and country i at time t; Si,t  is an index of the similarity of economic 
structure between Spain and country i; and Fi,t  is bilateral financial integration with country i. 
                                                                          
3. Apart from the aforementioned CPIS matrix on bilateral investment positions compiled by the IMF, the OECD 
publishes data on bilateral FDI flows, although we are more interested in financial integration involving total flows. 
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As described in section 2, the expected sign of the direct effect of trade links on 
output co-movement (α1 in Eq. 1) is ambiguous, depending on the nature of trade (intra- vs 
inter-industry) and of shocks (global versus industry specific). In the same vein, the coefficient 
of Fi,t in the same equation (α3) also has an ambiguous sign. The expected sign of the 
coefficient of Si,t in equation 1 (α2) should in principle be positive as the more similar their 
economic structure the closer output co-movement between two countries.4 
Although optimally one should conduct a panel data regression with the structure 
outlined above, the poor quality of the geographical allocation of financial data prior to 1997 
(especially portfolio transactions), leaves us with few observations to construct our measure of 
business cycle synchronization (ρi), namely the period 1997-2004. We, therefore, use the 
whole sample period to construct ρi and use period-averages for the rest of endogenous 
variables —as explained later—. We thus drop the time subindex for all variables considered 
in the system of equations and turn it, effectively, into a cross section. 
There are large differences in how synchronization (ρi) is measured in the literature. 
Kose et al. (2003) use correlations of output and consumption of countries with respect to the 
same aggregates in G-7 countries. They complement it with dynamic factor models to look 
for common components and assess whether their importance has increased over time, 
something that would signal a stronger synchronization. Heathcote and Perri (2004) measure 
cross-regional correlations of the log-difference of US GDP with that of an aggregate of 
Europe, Japan and Canada. They also propose and use a measure of correlation that 
corrects for the existence of high conditional volatility, based on Loretan and English (2000). 
Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) employ various indicators of synchronization, including a 
binary indicator of expansions and recessions, correlation coefficients and detrended series.5 
They finally use dynamic factor models to assess what is the role of common components on 
output synchronization. Finally, Imbs (2004) measures synchronization using cross-country 
correlations of band-pass series of quarterly GDP over the last 20 years. In this paper, 
we choose to measure business cycle synchronization (ρi) as the correlation between 
detrended annual GDP in Spain and each partner country. Detrending is done using Baxter 
and King’s (1999) band-pass filter.6 
Measures of trade linkages also differ across studies. Some of the earlier studies 
used aggregate measures of trade openness (i.e., global trade integration instead of bilateral 
trade links between two countries). This is obviously less appropriate to investigate the 
determinants of business cycle synchronization between two countries. As for bilateral trade 
relations, some authors have used de jure measures, namely restrictions to trade, such as 
import duties [IMF (2002)]. Another alternative, non-standard measure is the dispersion 
between two countries’ goods prices [IMF (2002)]. By far the most common de facto 
measure is the sum of bilateral exports and imports between two countries, divided by the 
sum of their GDPs [IMF (2002); Frankel and Rose (1998); Imbs (2004)], which is the one we 
use in this paper for trade linkages (Ti) between Spain (in the subindex as ESP) and country i. 
Denoting this measure by T1ESP,i we have: 
                                                                          
4. Note that Imbs (2006) estimates a similar system of equation imposing (β1=0 and γ1=0). Imbs (2004) imposes 
(β2=0, δ1=0 and δ2=0). 
5. Detrending is done using Baxter and King (1999) band-pass filter to eliminate low- and high-frequency components to 
keep business cycle components defined as those between 6 and 32 quarters. An alternative method used is log first 
differences (i.e. growth rates). 
6. GDP is measured at purchasing power parity and was obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. 
We also conducted the same exercise using the correlation of GDP growth rates or the correlation of HP-filtered annual 
GDP series. The qualitative results remain unchanged in both cases. 
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where XESP,i,t are exports from Spain to country i at time t, MESP,i,t are imports to Spain from 
country i at time t, and GDPi,t is country i’s GDP at time t.7 Note that we are taking a time 
average (over the period under study) of this measure. 
An alternative measure, proposed by Clark and van Wincoop (2001), which is 
independent of country size (and dependent only on trade barriers) includes also world GDP:8 
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The measures of financial linkages also differ in the literature.9 As in the case of trade 
linkages, earlier studies used measures of global financial integration rather than measures of 
bilateral links. In fact, the use of measures of global integration is even more pronounced for 
financial links than for trade links, because of the difficulties in finding bilateral data of financial 
transactions. Among the aggregate measures, several authors have employed aggregate 
de jure indicators, namely a global index of capital account restrictions from the IMF Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions [Prasad et al. (2004); 
IMF (2001b and 2002). Imbs (2004) uses the sum of these indices in two countries as a 
bilateral de jure measure of their financial linkages. Another de jure measure of aggregate 
financial integration is an index of stock market liberalization [Prasad et al. (2004)]. Among 
de facto measures, there are quantity and price measures, most of which are aggregate and 
not bilateral. The most comprehensive aggregate quantity measure is the sum of stocks of 
external assets and liabilities of foreign direct investment and portfolio investment, 
constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) from the accumulation of financial flows, with 
some valuation adjustments [IMF (2001b and 2002); Prasad et al. (2004), and Heathcote and 
Perri (2004)10. Other aggregate measures are total capital flows as a share of GDP, though 
they suffer from large volatility [Prasad et al. (2004)]. Others are proxies of risk sharing 
obtained regressing GDP on disposable income [Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003)]11. A bilateral 
quantity measure (i.e., of financial linkages) is the sum of gross asset positions between two 
countries, but this is only readily available for the US against the rest of the world 
[Imbs (2004)]. Alternative sources of bilateral data are equity transaction flows [Portes and 
Rey (2005)] although it is only available for a few countries, and equity holdings from 
the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey conducted by the IMF in 1997 and 2001, which 
also has geographical limitations, as well as some problems of underreporting [Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2004)]. There are also bilateral price measures, such as differences from 
covered interest rate parity, but with very limited data availability [Frankel (1992)], and asset 
                                                                          
7. Data for exports and imports is obtained from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. Data for GDP (at purchasing 
power parity) is obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. All data are annual. 
8. Note that if we use T2ESP,i  in the regressions, we can drop GDPWorld,t from the computation of the index, as it will 
be included into the constant term. All the results presented here are robust to measuring trade linkages in this 
alternative way. 
9. Edison et al. (2002) and Prasad et al (2004) provide surveys of different measures of financial integration. 
10. Prasad et al. (2004) also separate financial flows into its main constituents: FDI, bank loans and portfolio flows. 
Heathcote and Perri (2004) use, for assets, the sum of FDI plus the equity part of portfolio investment. They also test for 
separate measures (FDI on one side and equity holdings on the other). 
11. The idea is that with perfect risk sharing, disposable income should be unrelated to GDP, whereas in the absence of 
risk sharing, they should be closely related. Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2003) also use measures of consumption risk sharing. 
Imbs (2004) uses pair wise sums of this estimate of risk sharing as measure of bilateral financial integration. 
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price arbitrage based on rolling correlations of stock and bond prices [IMF (2001a)] which, 
however, suffers from potential reverse causality. 
In order to measure financial integration through a bilateral de facto measure, we use 
total bilateral financial flows (portfolio and FDI flows) from the Spanish Balance of Payments. 
Although data on international financial positions (stocks) would have been a better indicator, 
it was not available for Spain on a bilateral basis. We measure financial integration by taking 
the sum of the absolute values of inward and outward financial flows and computing a time 
average over the period of study, dividing it over the sum of GDPs, to scale their importance 
relative to the size of economic activity. Note that, by taking average flows over a period of 
time we diminish the volatility of this measure, one of the problems of using financial flows 
instead of investment positions. 
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where Iijt represents financial flows from country i to country j (ESP denotes Spain) at time t. 
In our benchmark regressions, we will use the sum of FDI and portfolio flows, but we also 
conduct robustness checks using only FDI flows and using total equity flows. Additional 
robustness checks are conducted using a level definition of financial linkages, as in 
Imbs (2006): 
2
, , , , ,
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The similarity in productive structure can be measured in several alternative ways. All 
of them are based on data of shares of each productive sector, and differ in the depth of 
disaggregation of economic activities and whether or not they concentrate on manufactures 
—at greater disaggregation12— or on all sectors —at lower disaggregation13—. Let sn,i,t be 
the share of industry n in country i at time t. Then the first measure of economic similarity can 
be expressed as 
1
, , , , ,
1
1 N
ESP i n ESP t n i t
t n
S s s
T =
= − −∑∑
 
where N is the number of sectors. Note that S1ESP,i represents the time average 
of discrepancies in economic structures, as in Imbs (2004)14. S1ESP,i might take values 
between 0 for identical structures and –2 for disjoint productive structures. Therefore, higher 
values for S1ESP,i imply more similarity between the structure of Spanish production and that of 
country i. Clark and van Wincoop (2001) use a similar concept but taking time averages 
of structures before computing distances in shares:15 
                                                                          
12. Typically, 2- or 3-digit ISIC classification groups. 
13. Generally, 1-digit ISIC classification groups. 
14. This is similar to Imbs (2004) but we prefer to use a minus sign in front of the definition of similarity of productive 
structure so that a higher value of S implies higher similarity between the productive structures in both countries. This of 
course only changes the sign of its associated estimated parameter, but neither its size nor its significance. 
15. In this paper we present the empirical results using the first measure of similarity of productive structure. Both 
measures outlined here are highly correlated, thus using the second definition does not affect the results significantly. 
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Industry shares sn,i,t can be measured using a number of different indicators. The 
three main indicators are shares in total employment, shares of production or shares of 
value added. All the results presented in the next section use the definition S1ESP,i described 
above applied to shares of value added, although the results are robust to using other 
definitions or data on employment or production, as they are highly correlated. We use data 
for the industrial sector at the two-digit ISIC level from UNIDO.16 
We also use a number of controls in the regressions as suggested by existing 
literature. One potential source of business cycle synchronization is the similarity of 
macroeconomic policies and exposure to global shocks such as movements in the price 
of oil. For the former we use a number of proxies: the volatility of the bilateral exchange rate, 
the average inflation differential and a dummy variable to account for use of the euro as official 
currency (in effect, a dummy for the use of the same currency). For the latter, we concentrate 
on oil shocks by introducing an index of similarity of oil dependency. More specifically, 
we take each country’s net oil imports as a percentage of GDP and average that percentage 
for the period 1990-2002. We then multiply that measure with the equivalent one for Spain, 
which is positive17. In principle, countries that are more dependent of oil should have a high 
and positive dependency ratio, whereas oil-exporting countries have a highly negative 
indicator. A high and positive product of both indicators indicates countries that are affected 
negatively by an oil shock, as Spain. 
In the case of trade linkages, a number of studies have suggested that gravity 
variables play an important role in explaining trade links between two countries. We therefore 
include (the log of) distance between countries, land areas, and dummy variables to account 
for access to the sea, a common main language and membership in the European Union.18 
Recent studies [e.g. Portes and Rey (2005)] have suggested that gravity variables 
might also explain bilateral financial linkages. Thus, we include (the log of) distance, the time 
difference between main financial centres, a dummy for common language and the partner’s 
per capita GDPs. This last variable tries to capture the idea that richer countries tend to 
generate more financial flows (both inward and outward). 
Surely the most difficult variable to explain is the similarity of productive structure. 
Following on Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) we use the pair-wise difference of per capita GDPs, 
based on the idea that rich countries tend to have a more diversified productive structure, but 
in a similar way among themselves, whereas poorer countries tend to be more specialized in 
production. 
Taking all these variables into account, we end up with a sample of 109 countries 
(counterparts to Spain), of which 21 are developed countries and 88 are emerging or 
developing countries (see table 13). 
                                                                          
16. We could in principle use data at the three-digit ISIC level and increase the disaggregation of activities. However, 
some countries in the sample do not report data at that level of disaggregation, and therefore we opted for a lower level 
of disaggregation in order to increase the sample size. 
17. Details of the construction and sources used for this oil dependency index can be found in appendix 2. 
18. Some studies include, instead of common language, a dummy variable capturing past colonial relationship. In the 
case of Spain both variables coincide. 
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4 Estimation Results 
As a preliminary step we show some stylized facts of the main variables of interest in this 
study: business cycle synchronization, trade and FDI linkages. 
The degree of bilateral business cycle synchronization between Spain and EU 
countries has increased substantially from 1960 to 1995 (Figure 1). Since then, it has fallen 
somewhat and now hovers at 0.6 (in terms of Pearson correlation coefficient of annual 
growth rates). Bilateral synchronization between Spain and G7 countries also rose fast 
from 1970 to 1976 but then fell again. Since Spain’s entry in EU in 1986, it has risen at a 
slower pace than synchronization with EU countries. Business cycles in Spain and in Latin 
American countries move in opposite directions since the late 1980s. Overall, the period of 
closer synchronization between Spain and other countries was from 1975 to 1985. 
Trade linkages between Spain and EU countries started to rise already ten years 
before Spain’s entry into EU but since then the increase has been exponential (Figure 2). 
Trade linkages with G7 countries began to grow later, in the mid 1980s and at a much lower 
pace, while trade linkages with Latin American countries haven remained relatively small 
throughout the period. 
Before the mid-1908s, Spain’s FDI linkages with the rest of the world were basically 
nonexistent. Since then, FDI with the EU and, to a lesser extent, G7 countries rose 
substantially (Figure 3). FDI linkages with Latin American countries also rose but at a lower 
pace. In 2000, there was a sharp fall of FDI linkages with all countries but it has recovered 
again in the last few years. As for total financial flows, they have risen substantially in the last 
six years (reliable bilateral data is only available from 1997). The surge concentrates on the 
euro area and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom (Figure 4).19 The importance of Latin 
America is much smaller than for FDI flows. 
Turning to the estimation of our system of four equations, we first report the results 
of the estimation of equation 1 in section 3, our equation of interest, using OLS. Table 1 in 
appendix 1 reports parameter estimates for different specifications. A salient feature of these 
estimations is the negligible role of financial integration or the similarity of productive 
structure in promoting a closer comovement of output between Spain and other countries. 
Only trade links seem to promote stronger output synchronization, and even that effect 
disappears once we control for membership of the euro area, which in turn might be 
increasing trade and financial flows. 
                                                                          
19. The United Kingdom accounts for almost 95 percent of total financial flows to EU countries outside the euro area. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of GDP synchronization between Spain and selected regions 
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Figure 2: Evolution of trade linkages between Spain and selected regions 
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Figure 3: Evolution of FDI linkages between Spain and selected regions 
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Figure 4: Evolution of total financial linkages between Spain and selected regions 
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There are good reasons to suspect endogeneity problems and thus biased estimates 
in table 1. Thus, we complement the estimation of equation 1 —the equation of interest 
to us— with the use of suitable instruments for the other three endogenous variables 
(trade and financial linkages –T and F– and the similarity of economic structure S).20 Table 2 
presents instrumental variable (IV) estimates for the same specifications as table 1, and a 
quick comparison hints that the endogeneity of regressors is indeed a severe problem. First, 
coefficient estimates differ significantly from those in table 1. In particular, financial integration 
and the similarity of productive structure are now statistically significant to explain output 
comovement, and the similarity of macro policies, as captured by inflation differentials also 
seem to play a role. Exchange rate differentials do not seem to play a role, but membership in 
the euro area is already used as instrument for trade and financial links. Second, the 
Anderson-Rubin test of significance of endogenous regressors also point to the importance 
of T, F and S as explanatory variables. 
Estimation of equation 1 by instrumental variables, however, still pools together the 
direct and indirect effects of trade and financial linkages over business cycle synchronization, 
for example through their effect over the convergence of productive structures between Spain 
and the other countries in the sample. If indirect effects through different channels go in 
opposite directions, the net effect might become small, contributing to its statistical 
insignificance. We thus go a step further than the IV estimation in table 2 and try to 
disentangle the direct and indirect effects of trade and financial linkages on business cycle 
synchronization, as described in the previous section. Thus, we conduct a three-stage 
least-squares regression (3SLS) on the complete system of four equations. 
The estimated parameters of equation 1 using 3SLS on the system of four equations 
(table 3) differ significantly (see e.g. estimation 7 in table 2, which is comparable), although 
signs are unchanged. Both trade links and the similarity of productive structures directly foster 
business cycle synchronization, possibly through external demand channels in the first 
case, and through similar exposure to external shocks (even is they are predominantly 
sector-specific) in the second. The negative influence of financial links on business cycle 
synchronization might reflect that an easier transfer of resources across countries allows a 
decoupling of business cycles, as highlighted by Heathcote and Perri (2004). Xing and 
Abbott (2007) obtain similar results for the effects of trade and financial links (using FDI 
flows only) and the similarity of productive structure for a different country sample. 
As discussed above, one key difference with Imbs (2006) is the importance of 
developing countries in the sample. In his paper he considers 41 countries, out of 
which 26 are emerging economies. In the estimations in this paper, we consider a sample 
of 109 countries, out of which 88 are emerging economies. The results in Kose, Prasad and 
Terrones (2003) that trade and financial links seem to increase output synchronization 
mostly in industrial countries might explain in part why Imbs (2006) finds a stronger effect of 
financial links on output synchronization, given the bigger weight of industrial countries in his 
sample. Indeed, we find some evidence of a different effect of developed and emerging 
economies when we estimate an alternative version of the system of equations described in 
table 3. In particular, we include a dummy variable for emerging economies, interacted with 
our measure of financial linkages as explanatory variables for equations 1, 2 and 4. With this 
inclusion we find that, for developed countries, the effect of financial integration on output 
synchronization is positive [as in Imbs (2004 and 2006)], but statistically not significant. 
                                                                          
20. Instruments used in the IV estimation are the same as those used for three stage least squares, described next. 
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However, the effect of financial links on output synchronization is negative (and statistically 
significant) in the case of emerging economies. This gives support to our claim that the 
higher prevalence of emerging economies in our sample might account for the difference in 
the sign of α3, between our paper and Imbs (2006). The same negative sign appears 
if we only introduce a separate effect for emerging economies in equation 1.21 
As for the control variables, our measure of similar fuel dependency is not statistically 
significant in explaining output correlations in this exercise, which might point to oil shocks not 
being an important factor driving global economic fluctuations in the period of study 
(1990-2003), as they probably were in the 70s or, to a lesser extent, in the 80s. The same is 
true for the inflation differential and the exchange volatility. However, being member of the 
euro area does seem to foster business cycle synchronization. 
Table 3 also shows, in its second column, that trade linkages (Eq 2) do not seem to 
be significantly affected by financial linkages (i.e. we cannot reject that β2=0), beyond what is 
predicted by standard gravity variables. These gravity variables, related to the cost of bilateral 
trade (e.g. distance, access to the seacoast and land area), are statistically significant and 
have the expected signs. 
Financial linkages, estimated in column 3 of table 3, seem to be determined also by 
gravity variables, such as distance, a common language and a common currency —with the 
expected sign— in line with Portes and Rey (2005). Beyond these effects and those captured 
by the partner’s GDP per capita (which significantly promotes financial links) trade linkages do 
not seem to be statistically significant in promoting financial linkages, as opposed to 
Aizenman and Noy (2004). Finally, a stronger correlation of business cycles is associated with 
lower financial flows as percentage of GDP. This reflects that risk-hedging opportunities 
are reduced —and thus gains from asset trade are lower— as economies become more 
synchronized, a point highlighted by Heathcote and Perri (2004). 
Finally, the last column in table 3 tries to identify the determinants of the similarity in 
productive structure (eq. 4). As in Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) the absolute difference in per 
capita GDPs is a good explanatory variable, together with financial flows. 
Beyond the direct effects on GDP correlation of our main variables of interest (eq. 1), 
there are also possible indirect effects of trade and financial linkages on business cycle 
synchronization, both through their influence on each other and though their effect on 
the similarity of productive structures. As described before, in table 3, our benchmark 
regression, we find no statistically significant effect from (to) trade links to (from) financial links, 
and only a significantly positive effect of financial links on the similarity of productive structure, 
which might point to the importance of FDI flows and its influence on production in the 
recipient country. 
Considering all —direct and indirect— effects of financial links on business cycle 
synchronization, the net impact is negative, as summarized by α3 + α2 γ2 + α1 β2 = –0.0083.22 
As expected by the non-significance of the indirect effects of trade, including them does not 
                                                                          
21. The results of these estimations are available from the authors upon request. 
22. Using the delta method, a test of significance of this estimate gives a t-statistic of –2.72, with a p-value of 0.007. 
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significantly change the estimate of its total effect on business cycle synchronization, given 
by α1 + α2 γ1 + α3 δ2 = 0.113.23 
The positive influence of a similar economic structure and trade links on business 
cycle synchronization is in line with Imbs (2004), though the effect of financial linkages is 
negative in our case and positive in his. This difference might be related both to the fact that 
we use a small open economy as a benchmark, a wider set of partner countries (including 
more emerging countries than in his sample), and bilateral financial links, instead of a broad 
proxy derived from aggregate financial integration in both partners as in his case. Another 
reason, as regard financial linkages, might be that our data includes FDI and portfolio flows 
which are only a part of all possible financial linkages, albeit possibly the most important ones 
that might influence the synchronization of economic activity. 
There are few other findings worth highlighting from the system of equations we 
estimate. First, we do find a reverse causality from business cycle synchronization to financial 
linkages (i.e. δ1 is significantly different from zero), as argued by Heathcote and Perri (2004). 
Second, the estimation does not find a double causality between trade and financial linkages 
(i.e.  δ1 and  β2 are not statistically significant from zero). 
Figure 5 summarizes the statistically significant relations out of our four-equation 
system. They are all positive except for the direct impact of financial integration on output 
co-movement. 
 
Figure 5: Statistically significant channels leading to business cycle synchronization found in 
the empirical exercise, and their associated signs 
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23. Again using the delta method, this estimate has a t-statistic of 2.11, with a p-value of 0.036. 
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Another important question concerns the economic relevance of the statistically 
significant effects found in the previous exercise. As described before, the total effect of trade 
and that of financial links on the synchronization of business cycles is given through their 
direct and indirect effects. Specifically, for our benchmark 3SLS regression in table 3, the 
effect of trade links on our measure of comovement of output is α1 + α2 γ1 + α3 δ2 = 0.113 
whereas the effect of financial links is α3 + α2 γ2 + α1 β2 = –0.0083. In order to gauge whether 
this effect on output synchronization is big or small, we can check the effect of increasing 
trade or financial links by one standard deviation, as described in table 11. Increasing trade 
links by one standard deviation starting from its mean raises bilateral cross-country correlation 
of GDP from 0.160 to 0.311. In turn, increasing financial links by one standard deviation 
lowers the correlation of output from 0.160 to 0.005. In both cases, this represents moving 
the correlation of output by around 40% of one standard deviation, an economically 
significant effect (table 10). 
We conduct a number of additional tests to confirm the robustness of our results. 
Since the most interesting result probably is the negative impact of financial linkages on 
output co-movement, we explore alternative measures of financial links. First, we include total 
financial flows in levels (instead of measured as percentage of GDP, as described earlier), an 
indicator also used in the literature. The results of this regression are shown in table 4, where 
we can see that parameter estimates do not differ strongly from previous estimates, and 
the total effects from trade or financial links to business cycle synchronization are very similar 
in magnitude. 
We turn next to decompose total financial flows in two groups. First, we take all flows 
related to investment in productive capacity abroad, which might influence GDP and/or trade 
more directly than fixed-income instruments like bond purchases. In particular, in table 5 we 
describe the results of the 3SLS estimation taking as financial links the aggregate of equity 
purchases and FDI flows over GDP. As expected, this narrower definition of financial 
integration now significantly influences trade links, although in table 6, where we use just FDI 
flows, the effect is wiped out. In both cases, however, the total effects over the 
synchronization of business cycles are not very different from those obtained from table 2. 
More specifically, according to regression results in tables 5 and 6, an increase of trade links 
by one standard deviation from its mean would increase output correlation from 0.16 to 0.29 
and 0.31, respectively. Equivalently, an increase in financial links by one standard deviation 
would reduce output correlation from 0.16 to 0.03 and 0.01, respectively. That is, when we 
use total equity flows as measure of financial integration, an increase of trade links or 
reduction of financial links by one standard deviation results approximately in an increase in 
output correlation equivalent to around one third of its standard deviation. When we use only 
FDI flows this ratio increases to around 40%, the same effect as in the benchmark regression 
(Table 10). 
The other dimension in which we check for the robustness of our results is the 
normalization of trade and financial links as proportion of GDP. Since we are interested 
in measuring the effect of trade and financial links on the synchronization of output, it is 
perhaps more relevant to normalize the size of those links by the smaller of the two GDPs 
in the country pair under scrutiny. The idea is that, for the same size of trade flows, 
two countries might be more synchronized the more unequal they are in size, since then the 
bigger country can “pull” the other more strongly through external demand or financial links. 
Thus, we conduct the same estimations displayed in tables 3, 5 and 6 but with trade 
and financial links defined as percentage of the minimum of the two GDPs involved. 
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The corresponding estimation results are presented in tables 7, 8 and 9. For the most 
part, the qualitative results are unchanged, except that now we do observe a bidirectional 
effect between trade and financial linkages mentioned in the literature (i.e.  δ1 and  β2 are 
statistically significant from zero). Both the signs and statistical significance of the effect 
of trade and financial links on output correlation are unchanged from the previous exercise, 
and the magnitude increases up to 60% of a standard deviation of GDP correlation, as 
summarized by table 10. 
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5 Conclusions 
This paper assesses the role of trade and financial linkages in the output co-movement 
between two countries, while considering a large number of interrelations between relevant 
variables through a system of equations. This allows us to identify direct and indirect effects of 
trade and financial linkages on output co-movements. While there are number of possible 
endogeneity problems associated with trade and financial linkages as explanatory variables 
for output synchronization, in theory one could eliminate those biases by using suitable and 
readily available instruments. However, the reduced form IV estimates might appear small or 
not significant because, in theory, direct and indirect effects might run in opposite directions, 
partially offsetting each other. When we conduct the estimation of a system of equations in 
order to separate direct and indirect effects of trade and financial linkages on output 
synchronization, we actually find conflicting direct and indirect effects of financial links, 
though, in the end, they do not reverse the sign of the negative direct effect on 
synchronization. 
In line with Imbs (2004 and 2006) we find that, both the similarity of productive 
structure and trade links promote the synchronization of cycles. However, the main 
contribution of the paper is the use of bilateral financial flows to measure bilateral 
financial integration in a small, open economy. When we do this, we find that, contrary to 
Imbs (2004 and 2006), bilateral financial links are inversely related to the comovement of 
output, which might point to financial integration allowing an easier transfer of resources 
between two economies, which could enable their decoupling. This is in line with what a 
standard international real business cycle model [e.g. Backus et al. (1992)] would predict and 
with results by Heathcote and Perry (2004), that point to financial integration fostering 
financial flows, and thus dampening GDP correlations as domestic investors seek out to 
diversify to less correlated economies abroad. It is important to point out that the direct 
negative effect of financial integration on business cycle synchronization we find in this paper 
is an alternative to Kalemli-Ozcan et. al. (2003) where financial integration reduces output 
synchronization indirectly, because financial links reduce the cost of an economy specializing 
according to its comparative advantage. 
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Appendix 1: Tables 
Table 1 
 
OLS regressions
Dependent variable: GDP correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trade Integration (T) 0.090*** 0.096** 0.093** 0.083** 0.015 0.026 0.027 0.019
(0.033) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.038) (0.033)
Financial Integration : all flows (F) -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Similarity of Prod. Structure (S) 0.105 0.058 0.035 -0.013
(0.094) (0.074) (0.080) (0.067)
Member of Euro Area 0.579*** 0.603*** 0.594*** 0.575***
(0.084) (0.088) (0.093) (0.089)
Inflation differential -0.063* -0.059* -0.061* -0.064**
(0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.031)
Exchange Rate Volatility 0.018 0.016 0.019 0.022
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.050)
Similar Fuel Dependency -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 1.364*** 1.429*** 1.315*** 1.238*** 0.448 0.568 0.554 0.528
(0.444) (0.477) (0.478) (0.460) (0.488) (0.517) (0.521) (0.469)
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.34
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All variables measured in logs except dummy variables.  
 
Table 2 
 
IV regressions
Dependent variable: GDP correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trade Integration (T) 0.127*** 0.172*** 0.180*** 0.116*** 0.108*** 0.150*** 0.169*** 0.100**
(0.034) (0.044) (0.047) (0.040) (0.036) (0.046) (0.049) (0.042)
Financial Integration : all flows (F) -0.004* -0.011*** -0.004 -0.010***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Similarity of Prod. Structure (S) 0.345** 0.064 0.315** 0.050
(0.139) (0.095) (0.131) (0.089)
Inflation differential -0.074** -0.069** -0.081 -0.077**
(0.032) (0.035) (0.049) (0.034)
Exchange Rate Volatility 0.001 0.000 0.032 0.006
(0.053) (0.055) (0.064) (0.052)
Similar Fuel Dependency 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 1.862*** 2.406*** 2.220*** 1.669*** 1.753*** 2.257*** 2.312*** 1.626***
(0.458) (0.563) (0.621) (0.563) (0.518) (0.637) (0.656) (0.618)
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.08 0.04 -0.05 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.19
Anderson (1984) LR-test of identification 108.85 62.46 45.76 80.52 106.78 62.05 41.61 88.23
     p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cragg-Donald Chi-sq test of identification 186.88 84.33 56.87 119.16 181.33 83.59 50.67 135.89
     p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Anderson-Rubin test of significance of 
endog. Regressors 436.13 436.13 436.13 436.13 206.64 206.64 206.64 206.64
     p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All variables measured in logs except dummy variables.  
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Table 3 
 
Three-stage least squares regression: system of four equations (1)-(4)
(Financial Linkages: total flows over GDP)
Equation Number (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
Output 
Correlation 
(ρ)
Trade 
Linkages
(T)
Financial 
Linkages
(F)
Similarity of 
Prod. Struct.
(S)
GDP correlation (ρ) -23.707*
(12.939)
Trade Integration (T) 0.110** -0.698 -0.023
(0.049) (2.916) (0.046)
Financial Integration:all flows (F) -0.012*** 0.017 0.011***
(0.004) (0.017) (0.004)
Similarity of Prod. Structure (S) 0.203* 0.043
(0.123) (0.582)
Member of Euro Area 0.561*** 0.190 17.934**
(0.137) (0.549) (8.632)
Inflation differential -0.040
(0.035)
Exchange Rate Volatility 0.003
(0.053)
Similar Fuel Dependency -0.000
(0.002)
Distance -0.856*** -10.080***
(0.155) (3.747)
EU-15 0.504
(0.527)
Common Language 0.742 20.312***
(0.526) (5.448)
Access to sea 0.792***
(0.214)
Partner's Land area -0.103**
(0.044)
Absolute difference of GDP per capita -0.213***
(0.051)
Absolute time difference 0.304
(0.229)
Partner's GDP Per Cápita 8.799***
(1.556)
Constant 1.337** -5.524*** -16.876 0.730
(0.649) (1.187) (36.245) (0.576)
Observations 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.20 0.59 0.44 0.45
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All variables measured in logs except dummy variables.  
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Table 4 
 
Three-stage least squares regression: system of four equations (1)-(4)
(Financial Linkages: flows in levels)
Equation Number (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
Output 
Correlation 
(ρ)
Trade 
Linkages
(T)
Financial 
Linkages
(F)
Similarity of 
Prod. Struct.
(S)
GDP correlation (ρ) -7.620
(11.850)
Trade Integration (T) 0.095** -1.328 -0.086**
(0.046) (2.553) (0.044)
Financial Integration : all flows (F) -0.011*** 0.035** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.015) (0.003)
Similarity of Prod. Structure (S) 0.335*** -1.121**
(0.124) (0.524)
Member of Euro Area 0.539*** 0.073 6.889
(0.136) (0.551) (7.873)
Inflation differential -0.066*
(0.037)
Exchange Rate Volatility 0.035
(0.057)
Similar Fuel Dependency -0.001
(0.002)
Distance -0.793*** -10.665***
(0.154) (3.333)
EU-15 0.604
(0.517)
Common Language 0.433 21.629***
(0.484) (4.954)
Access to sea 0.804***
(0.210)
Common Border 0.394
(0.659)
Partner's Land area -0.082*
(0.042)
Absolute difference of GDP per capita -0.126**
(0.050)
Absolute time difference 0.125
(0.215)
Partner's GDP 5.121***
(0.688)
Partner's GDP Per Cápita 6.776***
(1.553)
Constant 1.213* -5.382*** -93.813*** -0.173
(0.619) (1.184) (33.553) (0.553)
Observations 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.18 0.47 0.67 0.37
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All variables measured in logs except dummy variables.  
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Table 5 
 
Three-stage least squares regression: system of four equations (1)-(4)
(Financial Linkages: Equity flows [stocks + FDI] over partner's GDP)
Equation Number (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
Output 
Correlation 
(ρ)
Trade 
Linkages
(T)
Financial 
Linkages
(F)
Similarity of 
Prod. Struct.
(S)
GDP correlation (ρ) -10.026
(12.648)
Trade Integration (T) 0.101** 0.348 -0.016
(0.049) (2.844) (0.045)
Financial Integration:Equity+FDI (F) -0.011*** 0.029* 0.009***
(0.004) (0.017) (0.003)
Similarity of Prod. Structure (S) 0.188 -0.316
(0.121) (0.555)
Member of Euro Area 0.558*** 0.116 10.124
(0.136) (0.555) (8.386)
Inflation differential -0.049
(0.036)
Exchange Rate Volatility 0.012
(0.056)
Similar Fuel Dependency -0.001
(0.002)
Distance -0.818*** -7.069*
(0.152) (3.676)
EU-15 0.504
(0.536)
Common Language 0.411 23.041***
(0.517) (5.347)
Access to sea 0.798***
(0.215)
Partner's Land area -0.087**
(0.044)
Absolute difference of GDP per capita -0.225***
(0.049)
Absolute time difference 0.251
(0.230)
Partner's GDP Per Cápita 8.501***
(1.522)
Constant 1.266* -5.542*** -28.193 0.820
(0.654) (1.197) (35.541) (0.568)
Observations 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.24 0.57 0.54 0.46
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All variables measured in logs except dummy variables.  
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Table 6 
 
Three-stage least squares regression: system of four equations (1)-(4)
(Financial Linkages: FDI flows over partner's GDP)
Equation Number (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
Output 
Correlation 
(ρ)
Trade 
Linkages
(T)
Financial 
Linkages
(F)
Similarity of 
Prod. Struct.
(S)
GDP correlation (ρ) -23.313*
(12.722)
Trade Integration (T) 0.109** -0.763 -0.019
(0.049) (2.870) (0.046)
Financial Integration:FDI (F) -0.012*** 0.017 0.010***
(0.004) (0.018) (0.004)
Similarity of Prod. Structure (S) 0.191 0.054
(0.121) (0.584)
Member of Euro Area 0.555*** 0.192 17.025**
(0.137) (0.549) (8.488)
Inflation differential -0.039
(0.035)
Exchange Rate Volatility 0.002
(0.053)
Similar Fuel Dependency -0.000
(0.002)
Distance -0.856*** -10.070***
(0.157) (3.685)
EU-15 0.515
(0.525)
Common Language 0.733 20.682***
(0.538) (5.363)
Access to sea 0.793***
(0.214)
Partner's Land area -0.103**
(0.044)
Absolute difference of GDP per capita -0.218***
(0.050)
Absolute time difference 0.304
(0.225)
Partner's GDP Per Capita 8.594***
(1.531)
Constant 1.322** -5.527*** -16.494 0.793
(0.647) (1.186) (35.665) (0.573)
Observations 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.21 0.59 0.44 0.45
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All variables measured in logs except dummy variables.  
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Table 7 
 
Three-stage least squares regression: system of four equations (1)-(4)
(Financial Linkages: Total flows over minimum of Spain's and partner's GDP)
Equation Number (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
Output 
Correlation 
(ρ)
Trade 
Linkages
(T)
Financial 
Linkages
(F)
Similarity of 
Prod. Struct.
(S)
GDP correlation (ρ) -8.737
(11.957)
Trade Integration: trade over min(GDPi, GDPSpain) (T) 0.131** 6.565*** 0.021
(0.055) (2.520) (0.049)
Financial Integration: all flows over min(GDPi, GDPSpain) (F) -0.013*** 0.057*** 0.008**
(0.004) (0.017) (0.004)
Similarity of Prod. Structure (S) 0.134 -0.828
(0.122) (0.582)
Member of Euro Area 0.538*** 0.138 5.184
(0.138) (0.550) (8.038)
Inflation differential -0.039
(0.036)
Exchange Rate Volatility -0.001
(0.054)
Similar Fuel Dependency -0.001
(0.002)
Distance -0.622*** -1.406
(0.159) (3.218)
EU-15 0.433
(0.513)
Common Language -0.471 17.309***
(0.518) (4.817)
Access to sea 0.678***
(0.220)
Partner's Land area 0.012
(0.043)
Absolute difference of GDP per capita -0.210***
(0.050)
Constant 1.636** -7.299*** 27.278 1.267**
(0.709) (1.219) (34.514) (0.609)
Absolute time difference 0.174
(0.204)
Partner's GDP Per Capita 6.286***
(1.540)
Observations 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.18 0.45 0.49 0.45
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All variables measured in logs except dummy variables.  
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Table 8 
 
Three-stage least squares regression: system of four equations (1)-(4)
(Financial Linkages: Equity flows [stocks + FDI] over minimum of Spain's and partner's GDP)
Equation Number (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
Output 
Correlation 
(ρ)
Trade 
Linkages
(T)
Financial 
Linkages
(F)
Similarity of 
Prod. Struct.
(S)
GDP correlation (ρ) 1.288
(11.746)
Trade Integration: trade over min(GDPi, GDPSpain) (T) 0.112** 6.836*** 0.032
(0.055) (2.513) (0.049)
Financial Integration: Equity + FDI flows over min(GDPi, GDPSpain) (F) -0.011*** 0.065*** 0.007*
(0.004) (0.016) (0.004)
Similarity of Prod. Structure (S) 0.130 -0.961*
(0.121) (0.549)
Member of Euro Area 0.545*** 0.176 -0.028
(0.137) (0.537) (7.872)
Inflation differential -0.048
(0.037)
Exchange Rate Volatility 0.009
(0.056)
Similar Fuel Dependency -0.001
(0.002)
Distance -0.622*** 0.458
(0.156) (3.161)
EU-15 0.284
(0.490)
Common Language -0.700 20.215***
(0.500) (4.820)
Access to sea 0.666***
(0.221)
Partner's Land area 0.016
(0.042)
Absolute difference of GDP per capita -0.221***
(0.049)
Absolute time difference 0.114
(0.197)
Partner's GDP Per Capita 6.055***
(1.553)
Constant 1.428** -7.054*** 14.916 1.416**
(0.715) (1.226) (34.673) (0.601)
Observations 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.24 0.42 0.50 0.45
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All variables measured in logs except dummy variables.  
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Table 9 
 
Three-stage least squares regression: system of four equations (1)-(4)
(Financial Linkages: FDI flows over minimum of Spain's and partner's GDP)
Equation Number (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
Output 
Correlation 
(ρ)
Trade 
Linkages
(T)
Financial 
Linkages
(F)
Similarity of 
Prod. Struct.
(S)
GDP correlation (ρ) -8.582
(11.727)
Trade Integration: trade over min(GDPi, GDPSpain) (T) 0.130** 6.337** 0.026
(0.055) (2.473) (0.049)
Financial Integration: FDI flows over min(GDPi, GDPSpain) (F) -0.012*** 0.058*** 0.008**
(0.004) (0.017) (0.004)
Similarity of Prod. Structure (S) 0.123 -0.820
(0.121) (0.587)
Member of Euro Area 0.531*** 0.160 4.517
(0.138) (0.552) (7.884)
Inflation differential -0.038
(0.036)
Exchange Rate Volatility -0.002
(0.054)
Similar Fuel Dependency -0.001
(0.002)
Distance -0.617*** -1.571
(0.161) (3.157)
EU-15 0.449
(0.515)
Common Language -0.512 17.759***
(0.532) (4.727)
Access to sea 0.686***
(0.221)
Partner's Land area 0.011
(0.043)
Absolute difference of GDP per capita -0.214***
(0.050)
Absolute time difference 0.175
(0.200)
Partner's GDP Per Capita 6.146***
(1.513)
Constant 1.619** -7.305*** 26.425 1.342**
(0.706) (1.223) (33.869) (0.603)
Observations 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.19 0.45 0.49 0.45
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All variables measured in logs except dummy variables.  
 
Table 10 
 
Specification as in: Table 3 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 Table 9
Absolute variation of GDP correlation
Trade Integration (T) 0.1509 0.1254 0.1527 0.1750 0.1496 0.1737
Financial Integration (F) -0.1550 -0.1222 -0.1538 -0.2439 -0.2037 -0.2207
Percentage of standard deviation of GDP correlation
Trade Integration (T) 39.3% 32.7% 39.7% 45.6% 38.9% 45.2%
Financial Integration (F) -40.4% -31.8% -40.0% -63.5% -53.0% -57.5%
Memo:
Mean GDP correlation in sample: 0.160
Standard deviation of GDP correlation: 0.384
Effect on GDP correlation from an increase by 1 standard deviation in trade or financial links
 
 
 
Table 11 
Summary Statistics
Coeff. of
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variation 5% 50% 95%
Output correlation with Spain, 1990-2004 (ρ ) 109 0.160 0.384 -0.846 0.898 2.401 -0.528 0.173 0.838
Trade Linkages over partner's GDP 1997-20031 (T) 109 -13.379 1.336 -17.188 -10.143 -0.100 -15.711 -13.256 -11.584
Trade Linkages over min(GDPi, GDP Spain) 1997-2003
1 (T) 109 -13.274 1.355 -17.188 -10.143 -0.102 -15.665 -13.184 -11.184
Total Financial Linkages over partner's GDP 1998-20032 (F) 109 -16.350 18.676 -36.841 6.554 -1.142 -36.841 -2.503 3.242
Total Financial Linkages over min(GDPi, GDP Spain) 1998-2003
2 (F) 109 -16.255 18.760 -36.841 6.554 -1.154 -36.841 -2.362 3.650
Equity Financial Linkages over partner's GDP 1998-20032 (F) 109 -16.894 18.515 -36.841 6.139 -1.096 -36.841 -2.846 2.759
Equity Financial Linkages over min(GDPi, GDP Spain) 1998-2003
2 (F) 109 -16.894 18.515 -36.841 6.139 -1.096 -36.841 -2.846 2.759
FDI Financial Linkages over partner's GDP 1998-20032 (F) 109 -16.751 18.312 -36.841 5.635 -1.093 -36.841 -3.136 2.536
FDI Financial Linkages over min(GDPi, GDP Spain) 1998-2003
2 (F) 109 -16.655 18.394 -36.841 5.635 -1.104 -36.841 -3.136 2.536
Similarity in Productive Structure 1980-20003 (S) 109 0.594 0.489 -0.281 1.666 0.824 -0.158 0.497 1.401
Member of Euro Area (1=yes) 109 0.101 0.303 0.000 1.000 2.999 0.000 0.000 1.000
Member of the EU (1=yes) 109 0.128 0.336 0.000 1.000 2.617 0.000 0.000 1.000
Average Inflation differencial 1990-2003 109 1.994 1.530 -0.630 7.298 0.767 0.446 1.713 5.053
Exchange rate volatility 1990-20034 109 -1.415 0.998 -3.302 1.668 -0.706 -2.697 -1.612 0.779
Similar fuel dependency 1990-2002 109 -0.621 14.837 -73.975 13.445 -23.884 -28.360 3.481 11.020
Distance to main city (km) 109 8.424 0.785 6.217 9.883 0.093 7.140 8.672 9.365
Spanish spoken (1=yes) 109 0.156 0.364 0 1 2.337 0 0 1
Access to seacoast (1=yes) 109 0.807 0.396 0 1 0.491 0 1 1
Sharing a land border (1=yes) 109 0.018 0.135 0 1 7.348 0 0 0
Partner's Land area 109 12.032 2.154 5.756 16.653 0.179 7.621 12.378 15.855
Absolute time difference to main financial centre 109 -2.786 6.557 -13.816 2.398 -2.354 -13.816 0.000 2.079
Average GDP 1990-2003 109 17.877 1.928 13.594 22.877 0.108 15.206 17.622 20.978
Average per capita GDP 1990-2003 109 8.610 1.104 6.133 10.615 0.128 6.729 8.642 10.149
Absolute difference of percapita GDPs 1990-2003 109 1.271 0.946 0.043 3.616 0.745 0.150 1.106 3.019
1 Average over the period of the sum of bilateral exports plus imports over the sum of  GDPs
2 Average over the period of total bilateral inflows and outflows to and from Spain
3 Computed from value added from the industrial sector only. Higher values imply more similarity.
4 Coefficient of variation of the bilateral exchange rate with Spain (monthly average).
PercentilesNo. of 
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Table 12 
Cross Correlations
(Based on common 109 observations. Starred coefficients indicate correlations significantly different from zero at 95% confidence level)
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Output correlation with Spain, 1990-2004 (ρ ) 1.0000
Trade Links over partner's GDP 1997-20031 (T) 0.3130* 1.0000
Trade Links over min(GDPi, GDP Spain) 1997-2003
1 (T) 0.3065* 0.9615* 1.0000
Total Financial Links over partner's GDP 1998-20032 (F) 0.1094 0.4711* 0.5299* 1.0000
Total Financial Links over min(GDPi, GDP Spain) 1998-2003
2 (F) 0.1088 0.4674* 0.5312* 0.9998* 1.0000
Equity Financial Links over partner's GDP 1998-20032 (F) 0.1026 0.4692* 0.5288* 0.9833* 0.9832* 1.0000
Equity Financial Links over min(GDPi, GDP Spain) 1998-2003
2 (F) 0.1026 0.4692* 0.5288* 0.9833* 0.9832* 1.0000* 1.0000
FDI Financial Links over partner's GDP 1998-20032 (F) 0.0990 0.4676* 0.5245* 0.9997* 0.9994* 0.9832* 0.9832* 1.0000
FDI Financial Links over min(GDPi, GDP Spain) 1998-2003
2 (F) 0.0984 0.4639* 0.5260* 0.9996* 0.9997* 0.9833* 0.9833* 0.9998* 1.0000
Similarity in Productive Structure 1980-20003 (S) 0.1675 0.3243* 0.3992* 0.5765* 0.5792* 0.5823* 0.5823* 0.5714* 0.5742* 1.0000
Member of Euro Area (1=yes) 0.5396* 0.4803* 0.4977* 0.3491* 0.3493* 0.3462* 0.3462* 0.3379* 0.3382* 0.3506* 1.0000
Member of the EU (1=yes) 0.5415* 0.5260* 0.5468* 0.3974* 0.3977* 0.3945* 0.3945* 0.3847* 0.3851* 0.4020* 0.8727* 1.0000
Average Inflation differencial 1990-2003 -0.3608* -0.1796 -0.2133* -0.0294 -0.0321 -0.0428 -0.0428 -0.0208 -0.0236 -0.0442 -0.3132* -0.3573* 1.0000
Exchange rate volatility 1990-20034 -0.3272* -0.2167* -0.2284* -0.0903 -0.0913 -0.0781 -0.0781 -0.0822 -0.0832 -0.1321 -0.3501* -0.3892* 0.8362* 1.0000
Similar fuel dependency 1990-2002 -0.0264 -0.1379 -0.1302 0.0606 0.0609 0.0486 0.0486 0.0598 0.0601 -0.0086 0.0653 0.0646 -0.0450 -0.1174 1.0000
Distance to main city (km) -0.5098* -0.5828* -0.5669* -0.2913* -0.2896* -0.2732* -0.2732* -0.2853* -0.2836* -0.3396* -0.4993* -0.5420* 0.1624 0.2564* 0.0326 1.0000
Spanish spoken (1=yes) -0.3669* 0.0830 0.0511 0.3455* 0.3419* 0.3592* 0.3592* 0.3572* 0.3534* -0.1353 -0.1440 -0.1650 0.3252* 0.2391* 0.0189 0.3568* 1.0000
Access to seacoast (1=yes) -0.1792 0.2897* 0.3233* 0.1593 0.1611 0.1494 0.1494 0.1567 0.1585 0.1624 0.0092 0.0485 -0.0019 0.0062 -0.1670 0.0690 0.0818 1.0000
Sharing a land border (1=yes) 0.2604* 0.2897* 0.3076* 0.1437 0.1446 0.1443 0.1443 0.1411 0.1420 0.1683 0.4081* 0.3561* -0.1254 -0.1593 0.0318 -0.3215* -0.0588 0.0668 1.0000
Partner's Land area -0.1366 -0.1403 -0.0432 0.1980* 0.2034* 0.2070* 0.2070* 0.2002* 0.2057* 0.2638* -0.0919 -0.0827 0.2355* 0.2984* -0.2674* 0.1477 0.1106 0.0657 0.0186 1.0000
Absolute time difference to main financial centre -0.3595* -0.3881* -0.3659* -0.1070 -0.1055 -0.1093 -0.1093 -0.1024 -0.1010 -0.2768* -0.3083* -0.3585* 0.1068 0.2557* 0.2668* 0.6481* 0.2984* 0.1633 -0.0863 0.0636 1.0000
Average GDP 1990-2003 0.0432 0.1432 0.2977* 0.5698* 0.5777* 0.5788* 0.5788* 0.5658* 0.5740* 0.7358* 0.2496* 0.2986* -0.0639 -0.0464 -0.0985 -0.1104 -0.0172 0.2448* 0.1442 0.5999* -0.0394 1.0000
Average per capita GDP 1990-2003 0.2126* 0.4840* 0.5340* 0.6007* 0.6018* 0.5902* 0.5902* 0.5932* 0.5945* 0.6243* 0.4208* 0.4866* -0.3277* -0.4053* 0.0120 -0.2851* -0.0378 0.2369* 0.1475 -0.1603 -0.2194* 0.4433* 1.0000
Absolute difference of percapita GDPs 1990-2003 -0.1353 -0.4583* -0.4883* -0.5616* -0.5615* -0.5493* -0.5493* -0.5563* -0.5563* -0.6089* -0.3440* -0.3943* 0.2526* 0.3682* -0.0128 0.2418* -0.0164 -0.2841* -0.1584 0.1784 0.1653 -0.4047* -0.9665* 1.0000
1 Average over the period of the sum of bilateral exports plus imports over the sum of  GDPs
2 Average over the period of total bilateral inflows and outflows to and from Spain
3 Computed from value added from the industrial sector only. Higher values imply more similarity.
4 Coefficient of variation of the bilateral exchange rate with Spain (monthly average).  
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Table 13 
Countries included in the regressions (total=109)
ISO 
code Country Name
ISO 
code Country Name
ALB Albania KEN Kenya
ARG Argentina KOR Korea
AUS Australia LCA St. Lucia
AUT Austria LKA Sri Lanka
BDI Burundi LUX Luxemburg
BEL Belgium LVA Latvia
BEN Benin MAR Morocco
BFA Burkina Faso MDG Madagascar
BGD Bangladesh MEX Mexico
BGR Bulgaria MKD Macedonia
BLZ Belize MLT Malta
BOL Bolivia MUS Mauritius
BRA Brazil MWI Malawi
BRB Barbados MYS Malaysia
BWA Bostwana NAM Namibia
CAN Canada NER Niger
CHE Switzerland NGA Nigeria
CHL Chile NIC Nicaragua
CHN China NLD Netherlands
CIV Cote d'Ivoire NOR Norway
CMR Cameroon NPL Nepal
COG Congo Brazzaville NZL New Zealand
COL Colombia PAK Pakistan
CRI Costa Rica PAN Panama
CZE Czech Rep. PER Peru
DNK Denmark PHL Phillipines
DOM Dominican Republic PNG Papua New Guinea
DZA Algeria POL Poland
ECU Ecuador PRT Portugal
EGY Egypt PRY Paraguay
ETH Ethiopia ROU Romania
FIN Finland RUS Russia
FJI Fiji Is. RWA Rwanda
FRA France SEN Senegal
GAB Gabon SLV El Salvador
GBR UK SVK Slovakia
GER Germany SVN Slovenia
GHA Ghana SWE Sweden
GMB Gambia SWZ Swaziland
GRC Greece SYC Seychelles
GTM Guatemala SYR Syria
HKG Hong Kong TGO Togo
HND Honduras THA Thailand
HRV Croacia TTO Trinidad and Tobago
HUN Hungary TUN Tunisia
IDN Indonesia TUR Turkey
IND India TZA Tanzania
IRL Ireland UGA Uganda
IRN Iran URY Uruguay
ISL Iceland USA USA
ISR Israel VEN Venezuela
ITA Italy ZAF South Africa
JAM Jamaica ZMB Zambia
JOR Jordan ZWE Zimbabwe
JPN Japan
In boldface: countries with total financial flows greater than zero.  
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Appendix 2: Definition of Variables and Sources 
Output Synchronization (ρ): Measured as the Pearson correlation between the filtered 
series of GDP for Spain and for the partner country. GDP data was filtered using Baxter and 
King’s band-pass filter. Alternative specifications use H-P filtered data or the log difference 
(growth rates) of annual GDPs. Data for annual GDP at purchasing power parity was taken 
from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. 
Trade Linkages (T): Measured as the sum of imports and exports between Spain and a 
given country, over the partner’s GDPs. This measure is then averaged over the denoted 
period. That is, 
, , , ,
,
,
1 ESP i t ESP i t
ESP i
t i t
X M
T
T GDP
+= ∑
 
Data for exports and imports was obtained from the IMF’s Direction of Trade 
Statistics. GDP data was taken from the Penn World Tables version 6.1. 
Financial Linkages (F): Measured as the sum of inflows and outflows of FDI and portfolio 
flows between Spain and a given country, divided over the partner’s GDP. Alternative 
specifications use just the level of inflows plus outflows, or divide them over the minimum of 
Spain’s and the partner’s GDP. This measure is then averaged over the duration of the 
period. This measure can also be constructed for Equity flows (Stock + FDI) or for FDI flows. 
Data obtained from the Spanish Balance of Payments. 
Similarity in productive structure (S): Measured as the time average of discrepancies 
in economic structures. In particular, we take the shares sn,i,t of value added for industrial 
sector n in country i at time t and construct the following indicator of distance: 
1
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For value added, we take industrial sectors at 2-digit ISIC level. Data was obtained 
from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). 
Distance to main city: Computed at the great circle distance (in km) between 
Madrid (Spain), and the main city of a given country. In general, we take the capital 
city as the main city, except for the US (New York), Pakistan (Karachi), Brazil (Sao Paulo), 
China (Shanghai), Canada (Toronto), Switzerland (Zurich), Germany (Frankfurt), 
Turkey (Istambul), Israel (Tel Aviv), India (Mumbay), Australia (Sydney), Cote d’Ivoire (Abidjan), 
Kazakhstan (Almaty), Morocco (Casablanca), New Zealand (Auckland), Nigeria (Lagos), 
South Africa (Johannesburg) and Yemen (Aden). Data was obtained from 
http://www.indo.com/distance/index.html. 
Spanish spoken: dummy variable that takes value 1 if a given country has Spanish as the 
main language. Data was elaborated by the authors. 
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Access to seacoast: dummy variable that takes value 1 if a country has sovereign access to 
the seacoast. Data elaborated by the authors. 
Absolute time difference to main financial centre: Absolute value of the standard time 
zone difference between the main city used for “distance” and mainland Spain. Source: 
http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/. 
Member of Euro Area: dummy variable that takes value 1 if a given country has joined the 
Euro. Data elaborated by the authors. 
Member of European Union: dummy variable that takes value 1 if a given country has 
joined the European Union (before 2004). Data elaborated by the authors. 
Average Inflation Differential: Computed as the time average over the period referred of 
the absolute difference of quarterly inflation rates between Spain and a given country. Annual 
inflation data was obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
Exchange Rate Volatility: Computed as the standard deviation (over the period referred) of 
the bilateral nominal exchange rate (monthly average) between Spain and a given country. 
Monthly exchange rate data was obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
using bilateral exchange rates for both countries vis-à-vis the US dollar. 
Land area: Partner’s land area (in square km). Data for land areas was obtained from the CIA 
World Factbook. 
Population: Average population of partner country for the period chosen (in millions). Data on 
countries’ population was obtained from the World Bank. 
Average GDP: Partner’s average GDP measured at PPP. GDP data at PPP was obtained 
from the Penn World Tables 6.1. 
Per capita GDPs: Partner’s average per capita GDP. Data was obtained from the Penn 
World Tables 6.1. 
Absolute difference of per-capita GDPs: (between Spain and the partner country) 
measured as the time average over the referred period. Data was obtained from the Penn 
World Tables 6.1. 
Similarity of oil dependency: constructed as the product of average oil dependency in 
Spain and a given country i: 
, , , ,
, ,
1 1i t i t ESP t ESP t
t ti t ESP t
Moil Xoil Moil Xoil
T GDP T GDP
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− −×⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  
where Moili,t and Xoili,t are imports and exports of oil in country i at time t and ESP represents 
Spain. Data for oil imports and exports as well as nominal GDP (all in current US dollars) 
was obtained from the World Bank. 
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